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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wylie G. Hunter appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Idaho State Police Detective Terry Morgan investigated Hunter for drug
smuggling.

(R., p. 248 (State v. Hunter, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 519,

Docket No. 36728 (Idaho App., June 16 2011 ), attached as Appendix A).)
Detective Morgan's information was that Hunter was using rental cars to drive
from Coeur d'Alene to Canada, where he would pick up the marijuana, and then
drive back. (R., p. 248.) The next time Hunter rented a car Detective Morgan
waited for Hunter to return from Canada, and conducted a traffic stop. (R., p.
249.)

The traffic stop was justified both by observed traffic violations and

reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.

(R., pp. 249, 251-53.) A subsequent

search of the vehicle was justified, under the automobile exception, by probable
cause established because two police officers smelled an odor of marijuana
emanating from the car and the alert of a drug detection dog. (R., pp. 249-50,
253-54.)

After his motion to suppress was denied 1 Hunter pied guilty to

trafficking in marijuana. (R., p. 250.) He thereafter moved to withdraw his plea
so he could present additional evidence in support of suppression. (R., p. 250.)
The district court granted the motion to withdraw the plea, but subsequently

The district court did suppress some inculpatory statements Hunter made. (R.,
p. 250.)

1
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denied the renewed suppression motion.

(R., p. 250.)

Hunter entered a

conditional guilty plea to trafficking, and appealed. (R., p. 250.) The Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed. (R., pp. 248-60 (Appendix A).)
Hunter initiated the present case by filing a petition for post-conviction
relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in pursuing his suppression
motions.
Hunter.

(R., pp. 9-20.)

The district court appointed counsel to represent

(R., pp. 57, 90, 134.)

The state filed an answer and a motion for

summary dismissal. (R., pp. 52-55, 60-61, 241-45, 265-74.) The district court
granted the state's motion, concluding that there was no evidence supporting
either prong of Hunter's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 38598 (copy attached as Appendix B).) Hunter filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp. 436-38.)
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ISSUES
Hunter states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it failed to rule on and/or to
provide the specific discovery prayed for in the Petitioner's
application for post conviction relief; thereby abrogating
Hunter's rights under both the Idaho and United States
Constitutions to a full and fair hearing on the issue of
suppression of evidence obtained without a warrant?

II.

Whether the district court's decision to summarily dismiss
the underlying petition, absent an evidentiary hearing, has
denied the Appellant those due process rights promised
under Article I, Sections 13 and 18 of the Idaho State
Constitution, as well as those same rights guaranteed by the
5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution?

Ill.

Has the district court erred in its conclusion that Hunter did
not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel at his second
motion to suppress hearing sufficient to violate the
Appellant's rights under the applicable portions of both the
Idaho and United States constitutions?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5 (capitalization altered).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Does Hunter's claim he was entitled to more discovery than was granted
by the district court fail because it is neither preserved nor meritorious?

2.

Has Hunter failed to show error in the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Hunter's Claim He \Nas Entitled To More Discovery Than Granted
Court Is Neither Preserved Nor Meritorious

A

Bv The

District

Introduction
With his petition, prior to appointment of counsel, Hunter filed an Initial

Motion for Specific Discovery, Pursuant to I.C.R. Rule [sic] 57(b), and Idaho
Code(s) [sic] I.C. 19-4903 and I.C. 19-4906. (R., pp. 23-28.) Appointed counsel
did not pursue this motion (see, ~ ' R., p. 413), but instead filed a motion for
leave to take depositions of "defense counsel and/or other relevant witnesses
from the underlying criminal matter." (R., pp. 138-39.) The district court granted
this discovery request. (R., pp. 141-42.)
On appeal Hunter claims the court should have granted him extensive
discovery of evidence he believes both exists and would have shown that he was
entitled to suppression of evidence in the criminal case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 913.) His claim of error fails because it was not preserved. He abandoned his
initial motion for discovery and it was not ruled on. Even if this issue had been
preserved Hunter has shown no error.

B.

This Issue Is Not Preserved For Appeal
"This Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless the record

discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error." Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success lnvs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d
323, 331 (2008). The only order regarding discovery in the record is an order
granting discovery.

(R., pp. 141-42.)

Hunter never obtained a ruling by the
4

district court on his pro se motion, most likely because it was abandoned by
counsel, who pursued a different motion for discovery that was granted by the
district court. Having failed to obtain any ruling, Hunter has not preserved this
issue for appellate review.

C.

Even If It Had Been Preserved, The Discovery Issue Is Meritless
The "decision to authorize discovery in a post-conviction case is a matter

directed to the discretion of the trial court," and that discretion is not abused
unless discovery is "necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights." Hall
v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 131, 320 P.3d 1284, 1290 (2014) (internal quotes
omitted). Substantial rights are not at issue if the discovery request is "nothing
more than speculation, unsupported by any evidence."
1290-91.

19.:. at 131-32, 320 P.3d at

Post-conviction "provides a forum for known grievances, not an

opportunity to research for grievances."

19.:. at 132, 320 P.3d at 1291.

Hunter claims he should have been allowed discovery of a wide range of
items, including a tape of the traffic stop and subsequent search, evidence of
"Mysty Whited's work as a police drug informant," physical evidence found in his
hotel room that was testified to but not admitted as exhibits, and evidence that a
GPS device had been placed in his car. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) Review of
the record shows that none of this discovery is necessary to preserve Hunter's
rights and either the relevance or the very existence of the evidence Hunter
seeks is entirely speculative.
The district court, in the context of denying the claim counsel was
ineffective for not seeking discovery of the alleged tape of his traffic stop, found
5

that the evidence presented showed counsel had conducted discovery seeking
any tape of the stop and search, but that "none was available."

(R., p. 392

(Appendix B).) Hunter's request to discover the alleged tape is not necessary to
protect Hunter's rights and is based on base speculation.
In the context of ruling on Hunter's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for not seeking discovery of a drug ledger or Whited's history as a
confidential informant the district court concluded that, because the search of
Hunter's car was based on probable cause arising from odors coming from the
car, the physical evidence from the hotel room and Whited's credibility were not
shown to be material. (R., p. 393.) In the context of discovery the state adds
that Hunter's apparent belief that this evidence would have somehow supported
his suppression claims is entirely speculative, and there is absolutely no
connection to any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As for evidence the officers used a GPS to track Hunter, there is no
evidence it existed and no showing that it was relevant to the suppression
motion, much less any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
All of the requested discovery is based on speculation that the evidence
exists and speculation that, if it exists, it would have supported Hunter's
suppression motion. He has failed to show that the discovery is even relevant to
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if this issue were preserved
for appellate review, Hunter has failed to show that the discovery he sought was
necessary to protect a substantial right or was based on anything other than an
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unsupported hope that there was evidence that might support his suppression
motion.

11.
Hunter Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that Hunter had failed to make a prima facie

showing of either deficient performance or prejudice. (R., pp. 385-97 (Appendix
B).)

Hunter's claim of error relies primarily upon his assertion that he should

have been granted extensive discovery.
above, this argument has no merit.

(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) As shown

Hunter also asserts that he established a

prima facie claim of ineffective assistance regarding his renewed suppression
motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) This argument is also without merit, as set
forth below.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).

7

C.

The District Court Properly Concluded Hunter Had Failed To Present A
Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state,

allegations in a verified

post-conviction

application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported
by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App.

1994).
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and there is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
8

professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct App. 1989).
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App.
1999).

Application of these legal standards to Hunter's claims leads to the

conclusion that the district court properly dismissed the petition.
According to the Idaho Court of Appeals, the renewed suppression motion
focused on a prior search of a motel room.

(R., p. 251 (Appendix A).)

The

district court denied the renewed motion on the following bases: (1) "Hunter failed
to establish an expectation of privacy"; (2) "the evidence gathered in the hotel
search was not of particular relevance to the stop"; and (3) "the traffic violations
provided an independent basis for the stop." (R., p. 251.) Hunter asserts that his
counsel for the renewed suppression motion, Jim Seibe, was ineffective because
he (1) "failed to call Ted Pulver, the investigator"; (2) "never investigated the drug
dog used at the search scene to verify certification"; (3) "never spoke with
Richard Shabazian (the state's expert on vehicle ventilation)";

(4) "never

investigated the possibility of a GPS device on the vehicle"; (5) "never
investigated Misty Whited"; and (6) "never made a specific request for the audio
video tape." (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) The district court addressed all these
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claims and explained why Hunter had failed to establish a prima facie claim of
deficient performance or prejudice.

(R., pp. 392-97 (Appendix B).) The state

adopts the district court's opinion as its argument on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
summary dismissal of Hunter's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 23rd day of February,

KENNETH K. JORGEN~EN
Deputy Attorney Gine~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of February, 2015, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

WYLIE GAIL HUNTER
IDOC # 88952
ISCC H Pod 216-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

KENNETH K. JORG1~NS~N
Deputy Attorney General

KKJ/pm
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 36728
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plain tiff-Respondent,

: 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 519
Filed: Jone 16,2011

)

v.

)

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

)

WYLIE GAIL HUNTER,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge.
Order partially denying motion to suppress, affirmed; order denying Rule 35
motion, affinned; judgment of conviction and sentence, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Chief
Appellate Unit, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney _General; Jennifer E. Birken, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent
GRATTON, Chief Judge
Wylie Gail Hunter appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional

gtrilty plea for trafficking in marijuana, Idaho Code §§ 37-2732B(a)(I)(C) and 18-204. Hunter.
contends that the district court erred when it denied. in part, his motion to suppress. Hunter.also
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. We affirm.

I.
FACTS AND ·PROCEDPRAL. BACKGROUND

In 2007, Idaho State Police Detective Terry Morgan began investigating Hunter for drug
smuggling. · Detective Morgan had recei~ed information that Hunter would obtain a· rental car,
drive to the Canadian border, pick up marijuana, and return to Coeur d'Alene. Based upon tbjs
and other information, ISP began tracking Hunter's car rentals through the rental company and
notified the rental company that it should_ contact ISP when Hunter rented a vehicle.
Wylie G. Hunter vs. State of Idaho

Supreme Courtloocket #41992-2014
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September 2, 2007, an employee of the rental company contacted ISP to inform them that Hunter
had rented a vehicle that morning. Detective Morgan obtained the make, model. and license

plate number of the car and waited on Highway 95 at Athol for the car to drive past. At.
approx:frrurtely 2:22 p.m., Detective Morgan saw Hunter drive by in the vehicle. Detective
Morgan testified that he observed Hunter exceed

the speed limit and commi~ two illegal lane

changes. Because he was in an unmarked vehicle, Detective Morgan notified .Trooper Ronald
Sutton regarding the traffic infractions and advised Trooper Sutton to pull the vehicle over.
At approximately 2:38 p.m., Tro.oper Sutton stopped the vehicle and, after obtaining
Hunter's license and registration, went around to the passenger side of the vehicle to collect the
passenger's identification. While speaking with the.passenger, Chase Storlie, Trooper Sutton
detected. a faint odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle, which he relayed to Detective
Morgan, who had stopped behind the patrol car shortly after the stop. Hunter was removed from
the vehicle and asked to sit on the front bumper of the patrol car. Detective Morgan then
contacted Hunter and asked him where he was C9ming from and where he was going. Hunter
told Detective Morgan that he had driven an old pick.up from Arizona to have some service work
done, that he rented a vehicle in Coeur d'Alene, picked up Storlie, and drove to Sandpoint for
breakfast. Detective Morgan then approached th~ rental vehicle to speak with Storlie and
detected an odor of marijuana. Storlie told Detective Morgan that he met Hunter at the rental car
agency, and they then went to Sandpoint for breakf~ At that tim~, Detec~ive Morgan noticed
three boxes of heat-seal plastic bags behind the driver's seat. Detective Morgan testified that
based upon his training and experience, it is common for those types of bags to be used

to

package marijuana. Hunter informed Detective Morgan that the heai.seal bags were in the
vehicle at the time he rented the vehicle. Storlie told Det~ctive Morgan that he and Hunter had
purchased the bags that morning for Storlie's wife because she used them for canning and
freezing food. Detective Morgan testified that, based upon his previous investigation, he knew
that Storlie was not married. Thereafter, Trooper Sutton placed Hunter in handcuffs for "o~cer

safety,, reasons.

After observh:1g the traffic violations, Detective Morgan also ca!led Officer Richard
,.

i:
L

'

.

Reinking in' order to have a drug detection dog at the· scene. At the time of the stop, Officer

,.,,

':•I

Reinking was involved in another crimjnaJ matter and, as such, responded to the scene

!,

!:
i:
i,

approximately thirty minutes after the stop. The drug dog alerted on the trunk of the vehicle, and

!:
,.1.

,·

!•

Wylie G. Hunter vs. State of Idaho
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the officers located two large hockey bags with approximately seventy-five pounds of marijua.'1a
inside.
Hunter was charged with trafficking in more than twenty-five pounds of marijuana. He
fiJed a motion

to

suppress, claiming that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle and probable cause to search it. The djstrict court held a hearing where it granted in part~
and denied in part, Hunter's mo~on to suppress. Hunter pied guilty to trafficking in marjjuana,
and subsequently moved to withdraw his plea. The district court held a hearing on the motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, granted it, and allowed Hunter to renew his ·motion to suppress. At a
suosequent .hearing held on the motion to suppress, the court ultimately concluded that it would
make "no change" to its prior ruling. Hunter entered a conditional guilty plea. pleading guiJty to
trafficlcing in marijuana in an amount over twenty-five pounds, reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.
The djstrjct court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a unified sentence of
fifteen years. with ten years determinate. Hunter filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of

sentence, which was denied. Hunter appeals.

n.
ANALYSIS
A.

Motion to Suppress
At the initiaJ hearing on Hunter's motion to suppress, the district court found that there

was reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the. vehicle, based upon several months of
investigation prior to the stop, as well as due to the traffic violations observed by Detective
Morgan. The court further found that when Trooper Sutton smelled the odor of marijuana
coming froi:n the vehicle, probable cause to search the vehicle was established, which was
enhanced when Detective Morgan also smel1ed a somewhat stronger odor of marijuana coming
from the vehicle.

The court found that in .considering whether to suppress the evidence

discovered as a result of the search, the length of the detention, and the fact that Hunter was
handcuffed were irrelevant. The court cencluded:
This court is finding that the marijuana that was found in the trunk of this vehicle
is not the fruit of the detention. It's not the fruit of the handcuffing. It's the fruit
of the probable cause that ex.isted to search at the time that that marijuana odor
was detected.

Wylie G. Hunter vs. State _of Idaho
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;

The court also determined th~t, for purposes of Miranda, 1 Hunter had been de facto arrested at
· the time th_at handcuffs were placed on him. As such1 the court concluded that it would suppress

Hunter's explanation to Detecti've Morgan regarding'the mi]eage of the vehicle as it was given
after Hunter had- been handcuffed.
Atthe subsequent suppression hearing, Hunter challenged a search of his hotel room that
Detective Morgan conducted as part of his .inv~sti8"/1tion prior to the stop in this case. The
district court found that Hunter had failed to estabHsh an expectation of privacy in the hotel room ·
at the time of the search. The court determined that the evidence gathered in the hotel search
was not of particular relevance to the stop, and that thtr traffic violations provided an jndependent
basis for the stop of the vehlcle. The court also foun_d the testimony of the officers to be more
credible than the testimony of Hunter. The court stated that. it would make no change to its pdor
ruling, and subsequently entered a. written order statmg that its previous decision on Hunter's
I

motion to suppress "remains in effect"

On appeal, Hunter contends that the district corirt erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, the officers did not have

probable cause to search the vehicle to determine th~ amount of miles driven, and he was de
facto arrested when he was placed in handcu;ffs and, tlJerefore, all of the evidence obtained after
that point was a fruit of that illegal arrest. The stan~ard of review of a suppression motion is
bifurcated. When a decision on a _motion to suppress: is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evideince, but we freely review. the application

of constitutional principles to the facts as found.

State ~- Atldnron, 128 Idaho 559, 561 1 916 P.2d

1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to ~sess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, w~igh evidenee, and draw factual inferences is vested in the .

trial court.. State y. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.

Schevers, 132.Idaho 786,789,979 P.2d 659, 6.62 (Ct. A;PP· 1999).
1.

Reasonable and articulable suspicion ;

Hunter acknowledges that the distrfot court found that the officers had reasonable

suspicion to stop ·his vehicle based upon their prior criminal investigation, as well as by
'
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Wylie G. Hunter vs. State of Idaho
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observing traffic violations. He contends. however, that because he did not commit any traffic
vi'olations, there was no reasonable suspicion to detain him. 2

A traffic stop by an officer const_itutes a seiz_ure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 12~4, 1286
(Ct App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate

possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contr~ry to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 41'7 (1981); State v.
Flowers. 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct App. 1998). The reaso~ableness of the

suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the cfrctimstanoes at the time of the stop. State
v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474. 483, 988 P.2d 700. ·709 (Ct App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion

stan~ard requires less than probable cause but more ~an mere speculation or instinct on the part

of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the· facts in his or her
possession, and those inferences may be drawn 'from the officer's experience and la)N
enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App.
1988).

Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell

within the broad range of what can be described as ·normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128
Idaho at 561,916 P.2d at 1286.
At the hearing on Hunter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he testified that prior to
being stopped he was driving on Highway 95 on Sunday of Labor Day weekend in "bumper to
bumper" traffic the entire drive. He also testified he was driving in the slow lane approximately
five !I}.iles per hour under the speed limit. because he lnew what was. in the trunk. He did not

recall having changed ianes without sjgnaJing. The district court considered this evidence at the
second hearing on the motion to suppress. The court found that the traffic violations provided a
basis for the stop of Hunter's vehicle, concluding that it "continue(d) to find that there was a

2

Hunter does not chalJenge the district court's fiJ;)ding that the officer's prior investigation
provtded reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the ·vehicle, As sueh, the Court could
affinn on that basis. However, at the second hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court
relied pdncipally on the traffic Yiolations as providing a basis for the stop. We conclude that the
officers had reasonable and· articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon both the prior
investigation, as well as the traffic violati'ons. As the traffic violations issue was the only issue
briefed, we address that issue specifically.
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reasonable and articulable suspicion based upon the totality of the evidence that the Court heard

to. detain and stop the V.ehicle that Mr. Hunter was in." Indeed, Detective Morgan testified at the
initial suppression helll:ing to having observed three traffic violations -· speeding and making two
lane changes without signaling. There is substantial evidence jn the record to support the district
court's findings. As such, the traffic ·violations provided the officers with reasonable

and

articulabl~ suspicion to stop Hunter's vehicle. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred.

2.

Probable ca.use to search the ,rehicle

Hunter acknowledges that the district court found that the officers could smell an odor of
marijuana coming from the vehicle. Nevertheless, he maintains that the officers lacked probable
.
.
cause to search his vehicle to determine the amount of miles he. had driven. He contends that by

'.
,.;:

reaching into the vehicle and turning the ignition key, Detective Morgan performed an illegal
search and that all subsequent evidence obtained must be suppressed.
'

Hunter recognizes this Court's opinion in State v. Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518, 789 P2d 206
(Ct. App. 1990), and characterizes it as holding that the "smell of raw marijuana could provide
probable cause for officers to searc~ a vehicle." In fact, what we held in Gonzales is that "[t]he
smeil ~f marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrantless search."

Gonzales, 117 Idaho at 519, 789 P2d at 207 (quoting State

v.

Capps, 641 P.2d· 484, 487 (NM.

1982) (emphasis in original)). 3 Here, Trooper Sutton and Detective Morgan both smelled the
odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle, anc:l that alone provided probable· cause to
conduct a search.
We also note that this was not the sum total. of mfonnation available to the officers at the

time. Detective Morgan had also been conducting an investigation of Hunter for drug smuggling
for -several months. He testified that be· had information, which came from Storlie's 'exgirlfriend, that Storlie and Hunter were smµggling marjjuana across the border.' She observed

camouflage clothing. hiking boots, and large duffel bags. She told officers that Storlie and
Hunter would rent vehioJes and smuggle marijuana across the Canadian border. She also stated·

But see State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 599-600, 38 P.3d 633, 637-38 (Ct. App.
2001) (recognizing a distinction between the odor of burnt marijuana and raw marijuana and
holding that the odor of burnt marijuana is, only sufficient to "establish probable cause for a
warrantless search of the portion of the automobile associated with that odor").
3

ii

ihl
!'
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that they wou!d frequently stay at the Sandman Hotel in Canada. Detective Morgan obtained
copies of receipts from the Sandman Hotel indicating that Hunter had stayed there several times.
Detective Morgan also obtained several rental car receipts- of vehic]es rented by Hunter, and

several of them indicated that the mileage put on the vehicles

was approximately the distance to

the Canadian border and back. Detective Morgan was also aware that Hunter was on felony
probation for smuggling a large amount of cash across the border. A search of the vehicle for
that offense yielded night-vision goggles, camouflage clothing, hiking boots, and a GPS unit-·

items which Detective Morgan referred to as a smuggler's kit Detective Morgan also conducted
a search of Hunter's hotel room, the legality of which was chaJJenged at the second suppression
hearing, and officers discover~d a drug ledger.
Once the vehicle was stopped, both Trooper Sutton and Detective Morgan smelled the
odor of raw marijuana. Detective Morgan also questioned Hunter and Storlie ·about where they

were. coming from and where they were going, and their stories were' inconsistent. Detective
Morgan also saw three boxes of heat-seaJ plastic bags in the vehicle, which he testified are
commonly used to package marijuana. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the district court
erred in concluding that the officers had probable
cause to conduct a search of the vehicle.
;
3.

Suppression of the evidence

Hunter acknowledges that the district court found that whether he was handcuffed was
irrelevant as to the suppression inquiry because the search of the trunk was a result of the
probable cause established by the officers smelJing raw marijuana, not a result of the
handcuffing. Neyertheless, Hunter asserts that because he was de facto arrested when he

was

placed in handcuffs, all of the evidence obtained after that point was a fruit of an il!egal arrest.
We addressed a similar issue in State v. Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 174 P.3d 885 (Ct App. 2007).

In Keene, police w~re dispatched to an R:V. park in response to a call from the park's
host. When the officer arrjved, he noticed a brown Mercury Grand Marquis with two occupants

leaving the park. The park host reported_ that he suspected that the occupants of the car might

have been selfing drugs in or near the R.V. park restrooms. · The· following night, the same
officer was dispatch.ed to a location in response to a report of a car parked in front of an
unoccupied house. When the officer arrjved, he saw that it was the same car he had seen in the
R.V. pm;k the night before. The officer waited down the street and called narcotics officers for
assistance. Prior to their lllTival, the officer pulled his police car to the rear of the suspect
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vehicle. He did not turn on his emergency lights or h:is flashers. A male exited the vehicle from
the passenger side and told the officer that he had come to visit a relative who lived in the
unoccupied house. He admitted to the officer that he had been at the R. V. park the night before.
The defendant then exited the car from the driver's side and walked towards the officer: Upon
questioning, the defendant gave the· officer her name and date of birth. She then walked back to
the car, locked the doors, and left the scene on foot.: At about this time, the narcotics officers

arrived and asked the investigating officer if he was "done" with the defendant, and he sai<l that
he was not. The narcotics officers ran after the defen,dant who resisted. The officers ultimate1y
placed handcuffs on the defendant and took her back to the scene of the initial encounter. The
officers called for a drug-detection dog, which arrived about ten minutes after the defendant had
been handcuffed. The dog indicated on the car and a search revealed methamphetamine and
paraphernalia. Keene, 144 Idaho at 917, 174 P.3d at 887.
The defendant argued on appeal that her detent~on became a de facto arrest when she was
handcuffed, and was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspici(?n that she was
involved in criminal activity. Id. at 918, 174 P.3d at 8·88. We noted that there was no detention
until the narcotics officers ran after the defendant and stopped her. Id We tl;ien concludea:
Assuming arguendo that the detention that then occurred amounted to an
arrest without probable cause, this illegality would require suppression of the
drugs found in the car only if there was a causal connection betWeen the unlawful
arrest and the discovery of the drugs .. In State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 130;157
P.3d 1101 (Ct. App. 2007), we noted that the Unjted States Supreme Court !las
instructed that suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is appropriate
only where the challenged evidence is in some sense, whether direct or indirect.
the product of illegal governmental activity. See Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 804, 815 (1984). rhus, where a defendant moves to suppress evidence
allegedly gained through unconstitutional poiice conduct, the defendant bears an
initial burden of going forward with evidence to show a factual nexus between the
ilJegality and the state's acquisition of the evidence. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). "[T]he defendant n~ed only show that, on the events
that did take place, the discovery of the evidence
a product or result. of the
unlawful police conduct." Mc/3aine, 144 Idaho at 134, 157 P.3d at 110.5.
Subsequently, the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the
challenged evidence is unta~nted. Id at 133, 157 P.3d at 1104.
Here, Keene has !lot met her initial burden of showing a factual nexus
between her detention and the discovery of drugs in her vehicle. The police did
not gain any information from· an-esting Keene that caused them to search the
vehicle, and because Keene had already walked away from the vehicle before she

was
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was seized, we see no way that the canine sniff and ensuing search resulted from
an exploitation of the allegedly iHegal arrest.

Keene, 144 ldaho at 918-19, 174 P.3d at 888-89 (emphasis in original).
In this case, as in Keene, Hunter has not met his' initial burden of showin_g a. factual nexus
between his detention and the discovery of drugs 1n the vehicle. In fact, the district· court
specifically found that "the marijuana that was found in the trunk of this vehicle is not the fruit of
the detention. It) s not the fruit of the handcuffing.. It's the fruit of the probable cause that
existed to search at the time that that mariju~a odor was detected." Hunter acknowledges the
.

.

district court's findings but maintains that he was de facto arrested at the time that he was
handcuffed. However, as the district court determined', wh~ther Hunter was under de facto arrest
is irrelevant to the suppression inquiry unless ·there is,a factual nexus between the illegality and
the State's acquisition of the evidence.

See Keene,_144 Idaho at 918. 174 P.3d

at 889.

Hunter

does not even attempt to demonstrate that there is such a factual nexus. As such, Hunter has

failed to show that the district court erred, and suppression is not warranted in this case.
B.

Excessive Sentence
Hunter contends that his sentence was excessjve. He acknowledges that his sentence is

with.in the statutory limits. However, he contends that it is excessive under any view of the fa~ts.
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion stan_dard. State v. B_urdett,

134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 2991 304 (Ct: App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the
appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable. and thus a. cJeax abuse of discretion.
State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such
an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. Stare v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it
appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society· and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deter.rence,
rehabi1ita:tion or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, l 03 Idaho 565, -568, 650
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard
for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When

Wylie G. Hunter vs. State of Idaho

Supreme CouJDocket #41992-2014

256 of 454

2013/0CT/23/WED 16:08

KO CO PROSECUTER

FAX No. 208-446-1841

P. 012/015

reviewing the leng"..h of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,391 (2007).

'
.
Hunter asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to properly

.,',,

li

consider the mitigating factors in his case, specifically his health problems and his remorse. The

l

court.did not abuse its discretion. The court specifically noted that fr must consider the four
goals of sentencing and that it had considered them in this case.
With regard to Hunter's health problems, Hunter's counsel argued that while focarcerated
on the charges in this case, Hunter contracted a MRSA infection at the county jail. Hunter's
counsel asserted that it was ''well-documented" that Hunter had suffered from :MRSA for
;,

~:

!t

approximately sixteen months of his incarceration, which had resulted in scars on his arms,

chest, and neck, and that he had ground his teeth down due to the pain. Hunter's counsel
represented that he spent eight months in "the hole" in order to isolate him from other prisoners.
Hunter's counsel argued that, in considering what an appropriate sentence would be, the court

should consider that he be "given some credit time not just for time served but for the hard time
that he served." Essentially, Hunter's counsel argued that his health problems were a mitigating
factor.

In eonsidering counsel's arguments at sentencing, the district court concluded that it was
"not in a position to determine whether one person's time in the county jail is harder than another
person,.s time." The court accepted Hunter's counsel's ,repres'entations that he had a "particularly
miserable time in the county jail/' Nevertheless, the court proceeded to impose sentence, noting
that ''this was a significant drug smuggling scheme that you were involved in; seventy-five
pounds of marijuana in a hockey bag. There's indications that this was ~ot the first smuggling

venture at an, that it [had) been going on for some time." The court also considered Hunter's
,.

criminal history, specifically noting that he was on federal probation for the bulk smuggling of

j:

cash and that Hunter "perfonn[ed] on ~at probation by engaging in . . . drug smuggling

l,.:
:,

activities."

ff

While Hunter also argued that he was remorseful at sentencing. the court stated:
Your indication is that you take the marijuana'to Arizona. In the PSI you say
you're selJing it to help people, and you're selfing it for medical marijuana use.
· It's strange credibility to think that you are disposing of hundreds of pounds of
marijuana out of the benevolence of your heart to assist people with aches and
pains. The Court rejects that as incredible and unbelievable. The Court rather
makes the reasonable 'inference that you were a drug smuggler for the profit of it.

ll
l
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The court further found:

When counsel for the State describes you as thinking with clarity, I don't
think they're referring to your ability to drive a car or to negotiate your route. I
.think they're referring to the fact that this was a weU-planned out scheme. This
was certainly you were caught in the long run. This is not a mistake. This is not
clouded thinking at all. This was the cognizant decision to profit from illegal
smuggling of a controlled substance into our country. And whether it was being
distributed in Arizona or Idaho makes no difference to the Court What you were
doing.was bringing product into the country that may or may not be able to help
certain individuals but without doubt destroyed many, many, many more lives
than it at all helps at all.
The court was cJearJy aware of Hunter's arguments. Nevertheless, the court rejected
tho$e arguments in an exercise of its discretion. The court found Hunter's explanation for his
activities unbelievable and, while not explicitly referencing Hunter's expression of remorse,
detennined that he was a "drug smuggler for the profit of it" The district court appropriately
considered the goals of sentencing, and we conclude, having reviewed the record in this case,
that Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion.
C.

Rule3S

Hunter also argues that the district court abused its iliscretion in denying his Rule 35
motidn. A motion for reduction of sentence unde~ !.C.R. 35 is essentially a pJea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846; 771 P.2d 66, 61 (Ct. App. 1989). In
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the
motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203. 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). An appeal from the
deniaJ of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent
the presentation ·of new information. Id
Hunter argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion

because his sentence is excessive in light of the "new or additional" information regarding his
health problems. This contention, however, is belied '.by the record. None of the information
presented in the Rule 35. motion was new or additional information.- AH of the information

regarding Hunter's MRSA infection that was submitted on the Rule 35 motion was previously
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submitted at sentencing. While the arguments varied slightly, the information before the district
court was the same.

Hunter also argues that fhe district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35

!

!:

I

motion because it failed to consider his corrections and clarifications made at sentencing
regarding one of his prior charges, and then refen-ed to that prior charge in denying his Rule 35
motion. At the hearing on the Rule 35 motion, the district court simply stated that "Mr. Hunter
admitted that he seriou~ly defrauded an insurance company... The presentence investigation

!,

;

report indicated that Hunter self-reported a charge in Washington for conspiracy

to

collect

insurance. The PSI stated that Hunter stated that he was working at a used car dealership and
when "business went bad" he billed his insurance ta obtain money. At sentencing, Hunter's
counsel referred to this charg.e stating:
On Page 3-um-there's this prior record that's self-reported.... But from
what I understand my client actually owned a new Chrysler dealership. And at
the time had some involvement with someone when the business was going badly
was trying to O! asking him if they wanted him to bum the place down. I don 1t
know whatever happened to that. It's kind of interesting that that was selfreported. And there's nothing on the reports o:r from what I can see in the NCIC
or whatever the presentence people ran. I guess from my perspective that doesn't
really reflect much on this particular situation. The reporting itself was
interesting because my client did own the dealership. And it was a new car
dealership instead of being working at a used car dealership as was mentioned in
the presentence inyestigation report
·

Based upon .the record, while there may have been some discrepancies, the court was concerned
about the fact that Hunter defrauded an insurance company, a charge which he self-reported.
The court's reference to this charge does not indicate that it failed to consider any corrections to

the PSI.
At the hearing on the Rule 35 motion, the district court reiterated its reasoning for

imposing the sentence:

',,
'

Because I considered the· foe.tor that Mr. Hunter· had 75 pounds of
marijuana smuggled back into this country in a hockey bag after what appeared to
have been evidence of some repeated trips to Canada and back for the same
purposes. I also took into consideration the fact that Mr. Hunter had a 1987 or a
1988 incident that was a conspiracy to maliciously injure property. Mr. Hunter
admitted that he seriously defrauded an insurance company in 1988. It appeared
Mr. Hunter did a nine-month federal prison sentence in '87 or '88. There was a
i 993 misdemeanor malicious injury to property. And a 2004 felony of a fu]l cash

i!

,,,,'

i:

f!
!,
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smuggling that had a four-month prison sentence in which Mr. Hunter was on
probation at the time of the commission of this offense.
So when the Court looks at the mandatory minimum, the fixed minimum
of five years and the maximum in the matter of 15 years, the Court determined
that to give Mr. Hunter the relief that he requests would be simpJy to diminish the
seriousness of this crime. Mr. Hunter would essentia!Jy be getting the same
sentence that the gentleman that came before the Court with no prior criminal
history would get, that being the five-year fixed minimum as opposed tQ getting it
adjusted.
(Emphasis added.) While the court did consider the fact that Hunter had a prior .criminal history,
the record demonstrates that the court was particularly concerned about Hunter's actions in the
instant case. Based upon the nature of the offense and Hunter's prior criminal history, the court
concluded that a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years determinate, was the· most
appropriate. We conclude that Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

m.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in partially denying Hunter's motion to suppress. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hunter or in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion
for reduction of sentence. Accordingly, Hunter's judgment of conviction and sentence are

affmned.
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)

WYLIE HUNTER,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

CASE NO. CV 2012-4908

)

)
)
)

V.

STATE OF IDAHO,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)
)

Respondent.

This matter came on before the Court on Petitioner's Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief filed on July 20, 2012. The Petitioner was represented by Michael

Palmer, of the firm Anderson Palmer George & Walsh. The State was represented by
Bryant Bushling, Kootenai County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Oral argument was
heard telephonically on the matter on January 28, 2014. The Court, being fully advised
in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
In the underlying criminal matter, the Petitioner entered into a conditional plea of

guilty to the charge of trafficking in marijuana in an amount over twenty-five pounds,
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reserving his right to appeal t.lie trial cou..'1:' s der.ial of a motion to suppress. Toe Court of
Appeals heard the Petitioner's appeal on this matter, and affinned the trial court's order
on tlie mofi'on to suppress. See State v, Hunter, 201 I Unpublished Opinion No. 519,
Docket No. 36728 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 1 The Petitioner was sentenced to a unified sentence

of fifteen years, '\Vi.th ten years determinate. On June 5, 2012, the Petitioner filed a
Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief and subsequently an amended petition
was filed on July 20, 2012.
A comprehensive factual history of the underlying criminal case is set forth in the

Court of Appeals unpublished opinion regarding the motion to suppress. In 2007, the
Idaho State Police began investigating Hunter for drug smuggling. On September 2,
2007, Hunter's vehicle was stopped near Athol, Idaho. Detective Morgan of the Idaho
State Police testified he observed the vehicle exceed the speed limit and commit two
illegal lane changes.
The ISP trooper that stopped the vehicle testified he could detect a faint odor of
raw marijuana coming from the vehicle. Detective Morgan also approached the vehicle
and detected the odor of marijuana, and he also observed three boxes of heat-seal plastic
bags behind the driver's seat. Detective Morgan called Officer Richard Reinking to
respond to the scene '\Vi.th a drug detection dog. Officer Reinking arrived thirty minutes

later, and when t.i.i.e drug dog was deployed, it alerted on the tronk of the vehicle, After
the alert, the officers opened the trunk and located two large hockey bags with

approximately seventy-five pounds of marijuana inside.

1 This Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings and evidentiary record of Kootenai County Case No.
CRF 07-2044g, including the uni,ublished opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals which affirmed the
district court's ruling on the Petitioner's motions to suppress in the underlying criminal matter.
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At the fr1itial hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court found there was
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon several months of
investigation prior to the stop, as well as due to the observed traffic violations. Once the
trooper smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, probable cause to search

the vehicle was established. At a subsequent suppression hearing, Hunter challenged a
search of a hotel room that occurred prior to the stop. The district court determined that
Hunter failed to establish an expectation of privacy in the hotel room at the time of the
search. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not err in denying Hunter's
motions to suppress.
The Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to trial
coUfisel's representation ~'ith respect to the motions to suppress. These claims include
failure to procure discovery, failure to challenge witnesses, failure to call witnesses who
would have provided favorable testimony, and failure to determine whether the drug dog
was properly certified. The Petitioner has provided deposition transcripts of counsel and
investigators in support of his petition.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation oft.lie constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION
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(6) Subject to the provisions of section l 9-4902(b) th.rough (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore availabie under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion., petition, proceeding, or remedy.

l.C. § 19-4901(a).
A petition for post conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 194902(a).
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 ldaho 709,
711,905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
287,912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction
relief"must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the petition. l.C. § 19-4903." Id.

A petitioner in an application for post-conviction relief bears the burden of
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim
for relief" Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 'P .2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994).
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Under LC. § 19--4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However,
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
petitioner 10 the requested relief.'' Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655.
"If the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an

evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, 127

ldaho at 711, 905 P.2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation,
unsubstantiated by any fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary
hearing:' Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).

ANALYSIS
The Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can be broadly

categorized into two areas: ineffective assistance in preparing for the motions to suppress
which were presented to the court; and ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
present witnesses at the suppression hearings.

In Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 226 P.3d 1269 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court sets forth the requirements a petitioner must meet in order to survive summary

dismissal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive summary dismissal, the
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether counsel's perfonnance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of
fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case.
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 66&, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 206465, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153,
177 P.3d 362, 367 (2008). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant
has the burden of showing that her attomey's conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d
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at 367. This objective standard embraces a strong preswnption that the
clahnant's counsel was competent and diligent Jd. More simply put, "the
standard for evaluating attorney perfonnance is objective reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,
306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). Additionally, to establish prejudice 1 the
claimant must show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d at 367.

$dt.oger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624-625, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271-1272 (2010).
Summary dismissal is appropriate where evidentiary facts are not disputed,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences which may be drawn from the facts.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the
court's own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is the
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. "A claim for post~conviction relief will be subject to
summary dismissal ... if the applicant has not presented evidence making a
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 ldaho 599,
603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting Berg v. State, 131 ldaho 517,
518,960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998)). If there exists a genuine issue of material
fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to
the requested relief, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. State v.
Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Goodwin v. State,
138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct.App.2002). As the trial court
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary
hearing, summary dismissal is appropriate where the evidentiary facts are
not disputed, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn
from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444,
180 P Jd 476, 483 (2008); Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P .3d
712, 714 (Ct.App.2008). That is, the judge in a post-conviction action is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the
motion for summary disposition, but rather is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.
Hayes, 146 ldaho at 355, 195 PJd at 714.

Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 2012).
In the case at hand, the Petitioner has provided deposition testimony of the four
attorneys who represented him in court, and deposition testimony of two investigators.
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This case is similar to Zepeda, where the trial court is free to arrive at ti.e most probable
inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidentiary facts. In this case, it is not
disputed that the key to effectively defending the case was to successfully challenge the
police search and seizure of evidence stemming from a highway traffic stop and
subsequent roadside search of the Petitioner's vehicle. 2
1. Claims that connsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for the
motion to suppress.

The Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is narrowed to eleven
specific claims within the amended petition. Several of these claims fall under a broad
category of whether counsel's pretrial preparation fell below a level ofreasonable
performance. This issue was discussed in Thomas v. State, 145 ldaho 765, 185 P.3d 921
(Ct. App. 2008).
Determining whether an attorney's pretrial preparation falls below a
level of reasonable perfonnance constitutes a question of law, but is
essentially premised upon the cirCllillStances surrounding the attorney's
investigation. Gee v. State, 117 Idaho 107, 110, 785 P.2d 671,674
(Ct.App.1990). To prevail on a claim that counsel's performance was
deficient in failing to interview witnesses, a defendant must establish that
the inadequacies complained of would have made a difference in the
outcome. Id. at 111, 785 P.2d at 675. It is not sufficient merely to allege
that counsel may have discovered a weakness in the state's case. Id. We
will not second-guess trial counsel in the particularities of trial
preparation. Id

In this case, Thomas asserts ti.1at he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial attorney foiled to investigate the escort's
motivation for testifying against him and failed to aggressively crossexamine the escort.
Thomas generally argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for
failing to spend more time on his case and failing to do as Thomas
requested in his letters. For example, Thomas argues that his attorney was
2 See Deposition of Douglas D. Phelps, at 9-10; Deposition of :Peter C. Jones, at 6-11; Deposition of John
E. Redal, at 7; Deposition of James E. Siebe, at 9-10.
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ineffective for failing to provide the discovery that Thomas requested"t.11.e
t.aped confession Thomas made to the escort. Thomas alleges that, had this
discovery been provided the outcome of his trial may have been different.
Thomas cannot demonstrate and fails to allege how spending more time
on his case generally or doing specific tasks like sending him the
disco'Very would have had led to a different outcome at trial.
"The constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is
not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long series
of examples of how the case might have been tried better." Ivey v. State,
123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). We conclude that the district
court was correct in dismissing Thomas's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his attorney's failure to adequately prepare for trial
because Thomas has failed to allege or demonstrate any prejudice caused
by this deficiency.
id. at 769-770, 185 P.3d at 925-926.

In the case at hand, several of Hunter's claims deaJ with pretrial preparation.

First, Hunter alleges that not all relevant discovery was provided in the criminal case.
Hunter fails to provide admissible evidence that discovery was with.held in this case.
Attorney Siebe, who last represented Hunter in the criminal matter, testified that he
attempted to locate a video of the stop, but none was available. Deposition ofJames E.

Siebe, at 10. Further, there was testimony regarding Rule 16 requests for evidence from
the State. Id. at 12.3 Even if Hunter were able to establish that not all relevant discovery

was provided in the case, he would then be required to show this inadequacy would have
changed the outcome of the case. Thompson, 145 Idaho at 769, 185 P.3d at 926. Hunter

cannot show prejudice without first showing t.'1.at the relevant discovery was with.11.eld. If
a petitioner fails to present evidence to establish an essential element on which he bears

the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,
592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993).
3 Douglas Phelps testified it was the nonnal practice of his office to seek evidence of video of stops, and
that he would repeatedly ask for such evidence or file a motion to compel ifnecessary. Deposition of
Douglas D. Phelps, at I7.
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Second, Hunter claims a "drug ledger" that the police had supposedly located in a
search of a hotel room was not provided in discovery. As noted above, the underlying
criminal case against Hunter arose from the police search and seizure of evidence during
a highway traffic stop and subsequent roadside search of the Petitioner's vehicle. Thus,
even if the "drug ledger" in question had been provided in discovery, the Petitioner fails
to establish a material issue of fact regarding how this evidence would have changed the
outcome of his case. The claim is at best speculative. Because the Petitioner has not
presented any evidence on this claim, summary dismissal is appropriate. See Mata, 124
Idaho at 592, 861 P.2d at 1257.
Hunter also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to find evidence that
witness Misty Whited committed perjury, had two social security numbers, and was
working as a confidential infonnant for Detective Morgan. First, the record is devoid of
evidence that Ms. \Vhited was operating in this capacity. Second, even if Whited was a
confidential informant, this evidence would have no basis on the issue before the Court at
the motion to suppress-whether the officers had probable cause to stop and
subsequently search the vehicle. The Petitioner has not presented any evidence on this
claim, thus, summary dismissal is appropriate. See Mata, 124 Idaho at 592, 861 P.2d at
1257.
Hunter claims that cotu,sel was ineffective because none of the attorneys sought
evidence to show that the drug dog "Griz" was not certified.4 First, Hunter has no

Attorney Phelps testified that the isS\le of whether Griz. was a certified drug doi was a side issue, or less
materia~ because the officer's established probable cause when they noticed the odor of marijuana coming
from the car. Deposition of Douglas D. Phelps, at 31 .33. Attorney Jones testified it was generally the
practice of the office to figure out ifa dog was certified and that the certification was up to date.
Deposirfon ofPeter C. Jones, at 17-18. AttOrney Redal testified regarding his general practice regarding
cases with drug dogs. Deposition ofJohn£, Redal, at 25-26. Attorney Siebe testified that it was not
4
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evidence which shows that at the time of the stop, the drug dog was not certified. Even if
Hunter could show that the dog was not certified, Hunter cannot meet the requirement of
showing that this evidence would have affected the outcome of the case. Judge Haynes
detennined that once the vehicle was stopped, both Trooper Sutton and Detective Morgan
smelled the odor of raw marijuana, and Detective Morgan saw three boxes of heat seal
plastic bags in the vehicle. See State v. Hunter, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 519,
Docket No. 36728, at 7 (Ct. App. 2011). Ultimately, because Hunter cannot show how
evidence relating to the certification of the drug dog would have affected the outcome of
the motion to suppress, this issue is appropriately summarily dismissed. Thomas v. State,
145 Idaho 765, 185 P.3d 921 (Ct. App. 2008).
Next Hunter alleges counsel failed to procure employment records for an expert
witness for the State, Mr. Shabazian, in an effort to discredit his expert testimony
regarding the ventilation system of the vehicle Hunter was driving at the time of the
arrest. Similar to the issues above, Hunter fails to provide evidence that shows
Shabazian's employment records would discredit his testimony as an expert witness.
Also, an affidavit of a defense expert, Gabe Wilkins, was also presented to the court for
consideration. Ultimately, there is nothing in the record which shows that if counsel had
been able to procure Shabazian 's employment records, the outcome of the case would
have been different Therefore, this claLrn is summarily dismissed.
Hunter alleges counsel was ineffective because they failed to address whether
GPS tracking devices were used on Hunter's vebicle. 5 Hunter has provided no evidence

necessary to find out a.bout the dog's certification because Officers Sutton and Morgan both testified they
could smtll the odor of raw mariju11na in the vehicle, Depo$ition ofJames E. Sitbe, at 21-22.
5 Attorney Phelps testified that there was no indication GPS was use<!. on the car. DepoJition of Douglas D.
Phelps, at 33. Attorney Jones testil5ed that he believed officers were watching for the car based upon a
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in the record to show that his vehicle was being tracked with a GPS device. Further,
Hunter provides no evidence to show that had counsel been aware of tlris evidence, the
outcome of the case would have changed. The trial court determined that the officer had
probable cause to stop the vehicle based upon the traffic violations, and subsequently, the
search was upheld based upon a totality of the circumstances with respect to the officers'
observations, Thus, because Hunter cannot show that evidence of GPS use would have
changed the outcome of the case, this issue is summarily dismissed.
Hunter asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to interview co-defendant Chase
Storlie in preparation for presentation on the motion to suppress. Three of the four
attorneys who represented Hunter testified regarding their strategic planning regarding
the testimony presented at the hearing. Each stated that it would be unusual to present a
co-defendant in such a hearing, due to Fifth Amendment and ethical issues. 6 The
testimony from the attorneys establishes that it was a tactical, or strategic decision to not
present Storlie as a witness. "(T)actical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Booth
v. State, 151 Idaho 612,618,262 P.3d 255, 261(2011), citing Howardv. State, 126 Idaho

231,234,880 P.2d 261,264 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, Hunter's claim that counsel was

ineffective for not questioning Storlie, or not presenting Storlie as a witness, is summarily
dismissed.

description of the vehicle obtained from Avis, that there was no indication ofGPS use. Deposition of Peter
C. Jones, at l 8·19. Attorney R.edal testified he did not recall specifically in this case there being any OPS
issues. Dtposition ofJohn E Redal, at 27, Attorney Siebe testified he did not believe GPS was an issue in
this case. Deposirlon ofJames E. s,·ebe, at 22.
6 See Deposftion ofDouglas D. Phelps, at 34-37; Deposition of Peter C. Jones, at 19-21; Deposirfon of
John 'E. Redal, at 30-33.
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Finally, Hunter asserts counsel was ineffective in preparing for trial because none

of the attorneys traveled to the location where the stop occurred in order to challenge
Detective Morgan's testimony regarding the traffic violations he observed. At
deposition, counsel testified regarding either having an investigator look at the scene of
the stop, or that counsel was familiar with the roadway in that area. 7 Hunter fails to

provide evidence that had the attorneys visited the location of the stop, evidence would
have been gathered which would have changed the outcome of the case. Detective
Morgan was subjected to cross-examination regarding the stop at the motion to suppress
hearing. With no evidence to show the outcome of the case would have been different,
this issue is summarily dismissed.
2. Claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present witnesses at the motion

to suppress hearing.

Hunter also asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of
three witnesses. Hunter asserts Ted Pulver would have provided favorable testimony,
Frank Gabriel would have provided favorable testimony and finally that Rhonda Spencer
would have contradicted Detective Morgan regarding testimony that he had contacted
Spencer in her capacity as Hunter's probation officer, prior to the traffic stop and arrest.
The determination of which witnesses to call is a strategic or tactical decision
rnade by counsel.

Io evaluating an ineffective assistance claim, there is a strong presumption
that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable
Attorney Phelps testified that he could not recall whether he bad his investigator review the circumstances
oftbe stop, Deposirion ()/'Oougla1 D. Phelps, at 42-43. Attorney Jones stated that he did not need to see
the scene in this ca.se because the question was whether there was probable ca.we before the stop and
whether or not the drug dog took too long. Deposition of feter C. Jories, at 25-27, Attomey Redal
testified that because he lives in Coeur d'Alene, he is familiar with the stretch of roadway. Deposition of
John E. Redal, at 33-36. Attorney Siebe also testified regarding his familiarity with that stretch of
roadway. l)epostrion ofJames E. Siebe, at 10-11.
1
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professional assistance as "sour1d trial strategy." Russell v. State, 118
Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). Strategic or tactical
decisions made by trial counsel will not be second-guessed on review,
unless those decisions were made upon a basis of inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation. Id Trial counsel's decision of which wi1nesses to call is
encompassed in that aspect of trial counsel's role denominated "trial
tactics" or "strategic choices." State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 234, 628
P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981).

Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997). See also
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 PJd 741 (Ct. App. 2006).
In the case at hand, counsel made the tactical decision to not call Ted Pulver,
Frank Gabriel, or Rhonda Spencer. While the Petitioner has asserted that These witnesses
would have either p,ovided favorable testimony, or in The case of Spencer, testimony that
may have impeached Detective Morgan, the Petitioner fails to establish how the
testimony would have changed the outcome of the case. "It is not sufficient merely to
allege that counsel may have discovered a weakness in the state's case. Id We will not
second-guess trial counsel in the particularities of trial preparation." Thomas v. State,
145 Idaho 765, 769, 185 P.3d 921, 925 (Ct. App. 2008). Thus, these three claims are

summarily dismissed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the State's Motion for Summary Disposition is
b'Tanted.
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ORDER
Toe State's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this ~day of February 2014.

Q
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON STATE' S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION was:
_ _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
_ _ _ maile~prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, t h i s ~ of

February, 2014, to:

Kootenai County Prosecutor - CV
Bryant Bushling
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816
Michael Palmer
Anderson Palmer George & Walsh
Conflict Public Defender
923 N. 3rd Street

Coeur d'Alene ID 83814
Wylie Hunter
I.C.C. H Pod 216-B
P.O. Box 70010
Eoise ID 83707
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